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Abstract 
We examine the influence that co-workers’ have on each other’s fertility decisions. Using linked 
employer-employee panel data for Sweden we show that female individual fertility increases if 
a co-worker recently had a child. The timing of births among co-workers of the same sex, 
educational level and co-workers who are close in age is even more influential. Consistent with 
models of social learning we find that the peer effect for first time mothers is similar 
irrespective of the birth order of the co-worker’s child, while for higher order births within-
parity peer effects are strong but cross-parity peer effects are entirely absent. A causal 
interpretation of our estimates is strengthened by several falsification tests showing that neither 
unobserved common shocks at the workplace level, nor sorting of workers between workplaces 
are likely to explain the observed peer effect. We also provide evidence suggesting that peers 
not only affect timing of births but potentially also completed fertility, and that fertility peer 
influences spills over across multiple networks. Our results forward the understandings of how 
individual fertility timing decisions are made and suggest that social interactions could be an 
important factor behind the strong inter-temporal fluctuations in total fertility rates observed in 
many countries. 
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2  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies 1 Introduction 
Through its effect on work experience and career choices, childbearing represent one of 
the most prevalent and costly types of career interruptions for women (Mincer and 
Polacheck, 1974, Albrecht et al., 1999, Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010). When 
deciding about the timing of childbearing women face a trade-off: while delayed 
motherhood increases life time earnings, postponement is also associated with higher 
risks of childlessness and adverse health outcomes for mothers and children (Mincer 
and Ofek, 1982; Royer 2005; Miller 2006). To solve this non-trivial intertemporal 
optimization problem, individuals may use their social environment to acquire 
information about the costs and benefits associated with the timing of childbearing. 
In this paper we use an extraordinary rich data covering the fertility decisions among 
150,000 Swedish women in childbearing ages and all of their co-workers during an 
eight year period to identify co-workers’ influences on the individual fertility timing 
decision and examine how such fertility peer effects operate. Co-workers constitute a 
particularly important peer group in this context since some of the costs associated with 
childbearing are likely to be workplace specific. Moreover, most of us interact with this 
peer group on a day-to-day basis and the frequency of exposure to childbearing among 
co-workers is typically high in comparison with other social networks.
1  
The difficulties of identifying peer effects are well-established (c.f. Manski, 1993; 
Moffitt, 2001). Mainly two issues arise when attempting to identify the effect of 
co-workers’ childbearing on individual childbearing. The first is the simultaneity bias 
(or the “reflection problem”) generated by the simultaneous feedback between the focal 
subject and the peer group. The second problem is that of omitted variable bias. In our 
setting, it is for example essential to consider that family friendliness of jobs is a 
potentially important determinant of many women’s employment decisions (Herr and 
Wolfram, 2009), and that that friends and relatives are well utilized in job search (c.f. 
Montgomery, 1991; Ioannides and Loury, 2004). It is therefore of crucial importance to 
                                                 
1 Surprisingly few studies have used micro data to test for the prevalence and importance of fertility spill-over effect 
in practice. Those studies that have used micro data either looks at interactions within developing countries (Manski 
och Mayshar, 2002; Munshi och Myaux, 2006), among very young women (Crane 1991; Case och Katz, 1991) or 
within families (Kuziemko 2006). Moreover, the main interest has been focused either on intermediate outcomes such 
as contraceptive use, or on completed fertility. 
IFAU – Business, buddies and babies  3 make sure that the estimated peer effect is not caused by endogenous sorting of workers 
across firms sharing similar preferences or other unobserved determinants of 
childbearing. Similarly, unobserved shocks that independently affect both the timing of 
individual and co-workers’ fertility decisions could also lead to a spurious correlation 
between peers’ behavior. For example, correlations in co-workers’ childbearing could 
simply proxy for changes in firm policy, or an increased risk of mass lay-offs etc., 
rather than true peer effects. 
The detailed data and the focus on the timing decision of childbearing help us 
address these issues. First, the reflection problem is mitigated by focusing on the 
influence of co-workers past childbearing. Using lagged behavior of a peer group to 
identify the effects of social influences is in general not a fail-proof plan, since it 
requires that the agents are not forward looking, or that the transmission of the social 
effect follows the assumed temporal pattern (Manski, 1993). In this context, the inherent 
random nature of the exact timing of conception together with the monthly data on 
childbirth allows us to relax the assumption of non-forward looking agents. It is very 
difficult, both for the individual and the co-workers, to exactly predict when conception 
takes place. This key notion together with a possibility to consider a detailed lag-
structure allows us to form testable a priori predictions about the temporal pattern that 
the peer effects will need to follow in order for us to worry about simultaneity bias or 
endogenous selection. 
Second, we also consider several falsification exercises where we test if the 
employee is affected by (i) the contemporaneous childbearing of future co-workers, (ii) 
the childbearing of the true co-workers’ siblings, and finally (iii) the childbearing of the 
co-workers employed in the same firm but not in the same workplace. The individuals 
in these three “placebo peer groups” are likely to share many of the unmeasured 
attributes of the true co-workers and the focal worker, and are also likely to experience 
similar types of unobserved chocks as the focal worker. However, since they are not 
employed in the same workplace we do not expect them to influence the childbearing 
decisions of the focal worker unless the main effect is spurious. 
The results indicate that co-workers’ fertility increases the propensity of childbearing 
among their fellow co-workers. The estimated effect of co-worker’s childbearing on the 
4  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies probability of first birth follows an inverted u-shaped pattern with respect to time 
elapsed since the co-worker’s child was born. The maximum effect (9 % increase in the 
probability of own childbearing) is reached about 13–24 months after the birth of a 
co-worker’s child, and then declines. This observed social influence controls for non-
parametric monthly duration dependence, time-effects, work place size, regional 
unemployment rate and several important individual and co-worker characteristics. The 
robust dynamic pattern of the main estimates across specifications and subgroups, and 
the results from the falsification tests jointly support a causal interpretation of the main 
effect.  
Further explorations allow us to assess how individuals are influenced by their social 
environment in fertility. In line with a large sociological literature on friendship 
formation we document stronger social ties between same type co-workers than 
different type co-workers.
2 Much more weight is put on the fertility decisions made by 
female co-workers and co-workers who are close in age. However, there are also 
interesting deviations from this same-type pattern. For example, while the parity of the 
childbearing co-worker does not matter for first-time mothers, it is only the childbearing 
among co-workers’ of the same parity that matters for mothers with previous 
childbearing experiences. These strong within-parity peer effects and complete absence 
of between-parity peer effects among higher order births allows us to speculate about 
alternative mechanisms and also gives further support to the validity of the identifying 
assumption that omitted variables is not driving the results. Omitted determinants of the 
individual’s childbearing must be completely uncorrelated across women with different 
number of previous children within the workplace to spuriously generate the within-
parity pattern just described. 
Additionally our results indicate that social status may matters for social influences 
in the workplace since individuals are affected by co-workers who have the same or 
higher, but not lower, educational level. This result is consistent with evidence from 
                                                 
2 This pattern confirms the same-different type distinction in the model of friendship formation in Currarini, Jackson 
and Pin (2009) and is also consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that individuals tend to distinguish between 
same and different rather than distinguishing in any finer ways (Marsden, 1988, McPherson et al, 2001). 
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but not lower status.  
Finally we also provide suggestive evidence that fertility spills-over between 
different social networks; childbearing decision seems to be transmitted from the 
childbearing of the sibling of a co-worker via the co-worker to the focal worker with an 
additional lag of approximately 18 months. While all models of social effects assume 
that this is the case, as far as we know this is the first time that such across-network 
spill-over effects has been confirmed empirically. 
The results in this paper shed light on two well known empirical findings. First, the 
presence of the fertility peer effects contributes to the understandings of the remarkable 
fluctuations in total fertility rates observed in many countries. (see Figure A1 in 
Appendix for the evolution of the TFR in Sweden). While economists have traditionally 
focused on the effects of price and income in determining individual fertility the 
existence of social multipliers implies that relatively small differences in economic 
fundamentals can lead to large difference in aggregate fertility rates. 
Second, we contribute to the understanding of network formation and the structure of 
social ties in the workplace. The tendency for individuals to associate with same-type 
peers is a robust observation in many networks (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin and 
Cook, 2001 for an overview of “homophily”). The strong heterogeneity in the peer 
effect between same and other type peers found in this study highlights first of all that a 
strict focus on average peer within e.g. the workplace or neighborhood may 
underestimate the true economic relevance of social networks. Second it also suggests 
that the same social effects found in one context cannot be expected in groups 
comprising different composition of group members since the effect of groups varies 
with group composition.
3 From a policy perspective our results suggest that social 
effects will be more pronounced in groups of similar people. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
mechanisms through which peers may matter for fertility decisions. Section 3 describes 
                                                 
 
3Recent studies show that social interactions affect individual productivity, (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2007; 
Mas and Moretti, 2006) pension planning (Duflo and Saez, 2003), and work absence (Ichino and Maggi, 2000; 
6  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies the data. Section 4 introduces the empirical model Section 5 presents the results and 
Section 6 concludes. 
2 Conceptual  framework 
Why should individuals be influenced by their peers’ childbearing? Two main 
arguments can be traced in earlier work. 
First, peer effects can arise from social learning. This means that individuals deal 
with uncertainty by using their network as a source of information. A frequently 
suggested example of this mechanism is the role of social influences on the classical 
fertility transition through the dissemination of information about the use of modern 
contraceptives. In our case information about contraceptives is likely of limited 
relevance, but social learning may still be important since individuals can draw 
inference from the experiences of co-workers to learn about the pros and cons of 
childbearing (Montgomery and Casterline, 1996). Besides collecting information about 
the childbearing experience itself, learning in our context may also include learning 
about parental skills and institutional arrangements and requirements regarding parental 
leave (Kuziemko, 2006).  
A second explanation for why individuals could be influenced by the fertility of 
peers is that they may derive higher/lower utility from joint childbearing. Such network 
externalities arise when the utility from a specific activity depend on the number of 
participants (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Utility from joint leisure (Hamermesh, 2000), or 
in our case joint parental leave, is an example of why network externalities may be 
influential in this setting. Joint parental leave may be especially relevant for Sweden 
since parents can (and women typically do) stay home for a relatively long time with 
their newborn child before returning to work. However, individuals may also benefit 
from sharing their childbearing experiences with co-workers who are in the same 
situation or by the direct economies of scale that arise from coordinated childcare and 
the sharing of material expenses. 
                                                                                                                                               
Hesselius, Johansson and Nilsson, 2008). Except for Hesselius et al. all of these studies focus on social effects within 
a single firm. 
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peer group. However, since childbearing for most women imply a non-negligible time 
of absence from work there may also be other forms of network externalities that are 
unique for the workplace setting.
4 A priori it is not evident in which direction 
childbearing of a co-worker affects individual fertility. For instance employees may 
draw inferences from their co-workers’ labor market related consequences of 
childbearing or co-workers childbearing can give rise to peer pressure that alter the 
individual costs of childbearing. Additionally if employees’ compete for e.g. promotion 
opportunities within the workplace they may take strategic considerations into account 
when deciding about whether and when to have children. This argument can be 
motivated by a human capital model where time out of work leads to loss of human 
capital, as well as by a signaling model where there is a penalty for being the “first-
mover” in the workplace. Hence if individuals take the relative timing of childbearing 
into account it is easy to imagine how one worker’s fertility can be very contagious 
within the workplace. The period of parental leave that typically occurs directly after 
birth may be costly also for the establishment, particularly in small workplaces where 
labor substitution is generally more difficult. If workers internalize such costs then the 
individual’s probability of own childbearing may be reduced.  
Just as described, there are several potential explanations for why social interactions 
can influence fertility. However, a priori it is not evident which of these mechanisms 
that dominates. Moreover, an important task of this paper is also to try to characterize 
what the social interactions look like. We return to this matter in Section 5.3 where we 
explore the way that the fertility peer effects operate with respect to individual, 
co-worker and workplace characteristics. This provides us with several interesting 
patterns that together also help us to draw some conclusions about the mechanisms 
described above.  
                                                 
4 In Sweden mothers take 329 days of parental leave on average (which are fully financed through the social 
insurance system) during the first 4 years of a child’s life (RFV 2004:14) 
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The data used in this study comes from the IFAU database and it contains register 
information for the entire Swedish population aged 16–65. In addition to detailed 
individual background characteristics (LOUISE) the database holds information on the 
firm and workplace identifiers for all workplaces in which the individual is employed 
(RAMS). The data are further linked to the “multi-generation” register that holds 
information on the number of children born as well as the month of birth of each child. 
These data allow us to construct our measure of peer fertility and our binary outcomes 
variable; whether the focal worker gave birth to a child in a given month or not.  
We focus on female workers between age 20 and 44 and restrict the analysis to 
workplaces with less than 50 employees.
5 The size restriction is important since it helps 
us to focus the analysis on a well-defined peer group where individuals in the network 
are likely to interact on a day-to-day basis. The rational for choosing to focus on women 
are first of all that their fertility cycle is well-defined, but also that both from the 
individual and the firms’ perspective childbearing among women generates much more 
variation in terms of working hours and thereby costs due to the overwhelming share of 
parental leave time utilized by women. It should however be noted that this restriction 
does not apply to the co-workers. Thus the analysis looks at the impact of both male and 
female co-workers’ fertility on female workers fertility. 
To make the dataset manageable we select a random sample of 50 percent of the 
working individuals in 2004 and follow these eight years back in time (1997–2004). 
This means that women are defined to be under risk from 1997 through the end of 2004 
as long as they are observed in a workplace, until the month when they give birth or 
until the month they turn 45.
6 To avoid including individuals who are only loosely 
connected to the workplace we retain workers with yearly labor income above the 10th 
                                                 
5 The medical literature defines the childbearing age as years falling between 15 and 44 years old. However for 
simplicity we restrict our sample to individuals who were above 20 years old. Our choice is motivated by the fact that 
due to compulsory schooling in Sweden it is very rare that individuals start working and having children before this 
age. In 2004 only 3.4 percent of Swedish women had their first child before their 20
th birthday and the average age at 
first birth were 29 and 31 for women and men respectively in 2004 (National Board of Health and Welfare).  
6 Since we require that the individuals should be working we include them in our sample only those years that we 
observe them in a workplace. This restriction implies that we will over sample individuals with stable positions on the 
labor market. 
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7. For simplicity, for workers employed in multiple workplaces, we assume 
that the workplace giving the primary source of earnings also is the main arena for 
social interaction.
8 Because individual fertility as well as the social influence of peers 
may be different for women having their first, second and third child we consider up to 
three fertility spells. For the first-time mothers we define the duration as the number of 
months from age 20 and up to their first birth and for the second- and third-time 
mothers it is defined as the number of months from their previous child birth up to the 
second birth or until they are censored. Individuals who did not give birth during the 
observation period are followed from when they became fertile (had their previous 
child) and as long as they are of fertile age between 1997 and 2004.  
We combine this data with time varying information on the co-workers in the 
particular year, month and workplace and create indicators for whether any co-worker 
had a child in a specific month. We also add information on the age structure, gender 
composition, the share of co-workers with college education, workplace size, number of 
children of the co-workers and the sector of employment (public/private).  
Table A 1 reports summary statistics for the first, second and third order fertility 
spells respectively. We see that the typical women under risk of having her first child is 
27.6 years of age and works in a workplace with 18 employees. Furthermore, the 
average probability of having a child in a specific month is 0.005 and it varies 
considerably in our sample (sd. 0.07). Column (2) shows that the mean probability of 
having a second child is more than twice as high as the monthly probability of having 
the first child (0.011) suggesting that those who already have a child are much more 
likely to give birth to a(nother) child. The probability of third birth is only 0.002. These 
patterns reflect rather short timing between first and second order births and the 
common practice in Sweden to stop reproducing after the birth of the second child.  
Figure A2 and Figure A3 in Appendix show the baseline hazard functions for the 
first two births. The first graph illustrates that the likelihood of childbearing for first-
time parents in our sample peaks around age 30. This is somewhat higher than the 
average age (29 years) which is likely due to the fact that we have restricted our sample 
                                                 
7 The threshold is based on all employees at the labor market, both males and females. 
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that the probability of delivering the second child peaks after 28 months (2.3 years) and 
that most parents (70 percent) had their second child within 6 years from their first 
child. 
4 Empirical  specification 
As discussed above we model the individual fertility decision as a function of co-
workers past childbearing. An important feature of our setup is that we are able to 
provide evidence of what the lag structure of the transmission of the social effect looks 
like and we will see later in the estimation results that the estimated peer effect is 
consistent with that individuals indeed react to co-workers realized fertility and not with 
anticipation or joint planning of future childbearing.  
To capture the dynamic pattern co-workers’ fertility have on individual childbearing 
we estimate a conditional linear probability models which can be thought of as a linear 
approximation of a hazard model allowing for time-varying covariates, non-parametric 
duration dependence and time period effects (c.f. Allison, 1982).





Any co-worker had a child within 12 months
Any co-worker had a child wihtin 13-24 months
Any co-worker had a child wihtin 25-36 months
()
         ( )
         ( )












++ ijtc c ijtc δη ε ++
 (1) 
 
where the dependent variable  indicates whether employee i in workplace j had a 
child in calendar month c and duration t.
ijtc Y
t α  is a measure of duration dependence and is 
non-parametrically specified using specific month of duration dummies. These 
dummies captures that the baseline hazard of childbearing varies over the fertility cycle. 
The variables “Any co-worker had a child within 12, 13–24 or 25–36 months” are 
                                                                                                                                               
8 The vast majority of the individuals in our data is only employed at single workplace. 
9 We have also re-estimated the model using a Maximum Likelihood estimator. This did not alter any of the 
conclusions.  
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months prior to month c.
10 
ijtc X  is a vector of individual background characteristics, 
 is a vector of co-worker and workplace background characteristics such as the 
previous number of children to all co-workers, age distribution, gender and educational 
attainment composition, dummies controlling for establishment size in 10 worker 
intervals, sector of employment etc. 
ijtc C
c η are calendar period (year*month) effects which 
are included to control for general trends in fertility and finally  ijtc ε  is the error term.  
The main focus in our analysis is how co-worker childbearing affects the timing of 
first births since the variation in timing is largest for these births (see Figure A2), but we 
also report estimates for higher order births. Hence we estimate equation (1) for 
individual at risk of having their first, second and third child separately using OLS.
11 
For first births the duration dependence is accounted for by “months since age 20”– 
specific indicator variables up until the first birth (or until censoring) and for higher 
order births the number of months from the previous birth. Note that the combination of 
the duration dummies (months since age 20) and period (month*year) fixed effects also 
accounts for general cohort effects.
12  
The dynamic impact of fertility peer effect is captured by the parameters of interest 
1 , 2 β β and  3 β in equation (1). The estimates of these parameters measure the impact of 
co-workers’ recent fertility on the likelihood of childbearing in a specific month. The 
maintained assumption for identification is that there are no unobservable determinants 
correlated with both the lagged timing of co-workers fertility and the focal worker’s 
probability of giving birth to a child in month c. However, unobserved common shocks 
that change the probability of childbearing for all co-workers may generate precisely 
this type of spurious correlation between the fertility of the co-workers and the focal 
worker. While the period fixed effects accounts for general fluctuations in fertility (due 
to e.g. general policy shift in e.g. childcare allowances, or business cycle effects), there 
                                                 
10 The variable “Any colleague had a child within 12 months” counts from t-1 to t-12. Hence by construction the 
dummy takes on the value zero if the colleague delivered in the same month as the individual. This implies that we 
avoid the possibility that two colleagues having a child together show up as one of them responding to the other. 
11 During our observation period higher order birth is uncommon. 
12 For the second and third births regressions we also include year of birth fixed effects. 
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workers in a particular workplace e.g. increased job flexibility, management changes, or 
an increased risk of mass lay-offs. 
 Moreover, the identifying assumption could also be violated if co-workers share 
other unobserved characteristics that affect the timing of childbearing. One example is 
similar taste for childbearing. Sorting of this kind is a valid concern since family 
friendliness of jobs is an important determinant of many woman’s employment 
decisions (Herr and Wolfram, 2009). It is furthermore well established that friends and 
relatives are a well-utilized way to find jobs (c.f. Montgomery, 1991; Ioannides and 
Loury, 2004). Sorting for these or other reasons associated with childbearing could lead 
to very homogenous workplaces and result in correlations between co-workers’ 
childbearing even if they are not directly influenced by each other’s behavior.
13 
However the difficulty in foreseeing exactly when conception takes place helps us to 
form expectations about how the estimates of the parameters of interest in equation (1) 
should behave for us to worry that omitted variables biases our estimator. First, suppose 
that two individuals (co-workers) start trying to conceive at the same time (e.g. due to 
unobserved common shocks at the workplace level). Due to the partly random nature of 
timing of conception some will conceive sooner than others. However, calculations in 
Kuziemko (2006) suggest the probability that the two individuals will end up having 
children more than 6 months apart is only around 14%. This implies that if unobserved 
common shocks are causing a spurious correlation between co-workers’ fertility 
decisions then we expect the strongest effect to show up during the first 12 months 
period after the birth of a co-worker’s child and then decline (i.e. 123 β ββ >> ). 
Furthermore if the estimates simply reflect endogenous sorting of workers then we 
                                                 
13 A simple but unfeasible path to follow in order to try to control for workers sorting would be to add workplace 
fixed effects to equation (1). However, considering that we have a panel stretching only over 8 years and that we 
include lagged dependent variables for up to 36 months (which would be what the “co-worker had a child” dummies 
would be characterized as in a within-workplace analysis) the within-workplace estimates would, as is well known, 
be severely downward biased using an OLS estimator (Nickell, 1981). An alternative way to solve this problem 
would be to aggregate the data to the workplace level and then run regressions using a GMM estimator. But since an 
important focus of our analysis is to study in which way peer effects operate in relation to individual characteristics 
we feel reluctant to take this measure, and instead focus on other ways to make sure that the peer effects are not 
driven by endogenous sorting across workplaces (see discussion below). 
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suppose that workers conceive independently of each other (i.e. no social interactions) 
with some given probability each month. Then since there is an equal chance to have a 
co-worker who gave birth within 12, 13–24, and 25–36 months we would expect 
that 123 β ββ == . We will see that our estimates do not match either of these predictions. 
Moreover the validity of our main estimates is also strengthened by a number of 
robustness checks and falsification test. These are described in detail in Section 5.2. But 
first we turn to our main results. 
5 Results 
5.1 Main  results 
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the baseline estimates of the three β ’s from equation (1) 
capturing the impact of co-workers’ childbearing on own fertility for first-birth women 
after controlling for duration dependence  () d α  and period (year×month) fixed effects. 
The first, second and third row report the estimates of  1 β ,  2 β  and  3 β , i.e. the estimated 
impact of being exposed to a co-worker who had a child 1–12, 13–24 and 25–36 months 
ago respectively. The estimates of  1 β  are small and not significantly different from zero, 
but still precisely estimated. In contrast the estimates of  2 β  show a positive association 
between the focal workers childbearing and the past childbearing of her co-workers. 
Evaluated at the mean probability of childbearing this estimate suggests that individuals 
are on average 10.9 percent (0.00057/0.00523) more likely to have their first child 13–
24 months after the birth of a co-worker’s child. The inclusion of additional individual 
level controls for marital status, and college education (Column 2), as well as co-worker 
and workplace controls (Column (3)) does not alter the picture (see Table A2 in 
Appendix for all controls). The robustness of the estimates to the inclusion of these 
important covariates is reassuring since it suggests that bias due to omitted variables 
probably also are less of a concern. 
Together the three estimates suggest that the co-workers’ fertility decisions primarily 
increase fertility decisions with a lag of about one year after the birth of a co-worker’s 
14  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies child. Hence, for first order births the influence of peers’ childbearing is not driven by 
the immediate news that a co-worker is expecting, since the peer effect shows up first 
after the co-worker’s baby is born. Even more importantly, the inverted u-shaped 
pattern of the effect with respect to the time elapsed since a co-workers’ child was born 
speaks against the alternative hypothesis of unobserved common shocks or that co-
workers plan their births so to be able to enjoy joint maternity leave. As discussed 
above if unobserved common shocks would induce individuals to start trying to 
conceive simultaneously we would expect to find the largest effect within the first 6 
months. In our case we do not even find a significant effect within the first 12–month 
period after a birth of a co-workers’ child. This clear and consistent pattern across 
specifications and (as we show below) sub-samples suggests that common unobserved 
shocks is not driving the estimates of the social effect. Similarly, as motivated above the 
pattern does not seem to be consistent with a situation where endogenous sorting of 
workers is causing a spurious correlation in the timing of pregnancy.  
Table 1 Baseline estimates of co-worker’s fertility on the probability of first birth 
Specification:  (1) (2) (3) 
Sample:   First births  First births  First births 
Any co-worker had a 
child within:  
   
1–12 months  0.00002 0.00003 0.00005 
  (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) 
13–24 months   0.00057*** 0.00056*** 0.00047*** 
  (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) 
25–36 months   0.00029*** 0.00028***  0.00013* 
  (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) 
Duration dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year×Month dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Own char.  No  Yes  Yes 
Workplace char.  No  No  Yes 
Mean Y  0.00523  0.00523  0.00523 
Observations 5,575,497  5,575,497  5,573,397 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for 
serial correlation at the workplace level are shown in parenthesis. The level of analysis is the individual-month. In 
addition to the fixed effects indicated by the table regression (3) controls for establishment size dummies in intervals 
of ten employees as well as the regional (county/year) unemployment rate where the workplace is located. The 
workplace characteristics includes number of children of co-workers, the share of co-workers in fertile age, the share 
of co-workers, close-in-age, share of female co-workers, share married co-workers, share of co-workers with college 
education. 
 
To put our estimates in perspective consider first that for example Del Bono et al. 
(2008) find that women are about 10% less likely to have a child in the first couple of 
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subsidies with the equivalent of USD 10,000 increased fertility for eligible Swedish 
couples by about 5-10% within 18 months. The magnitudes of the social effect are 
furthermore very similar to those found in recent studies also focusing on co-worker 
peer effects in general. For example, Mas and Moretti (2009); Falk and Ichino, (2008); 
Ichino and Maggi (2000) and Hesselius, Johansson and Nilsson (2009) all find 
co-worker peer effects which are in the vicinity of our estimates. 
5.2  Robustness checks and falsification tests 
5.2.1 Robustness  checks 
Our results are based on the maintained assumption that unobserved determinants of the 
timing of fertility are uncorrelated within the workplace. While we can never test this 
identifying assumption directly, the richness of the data allows us to design several 
indirect tests to assess the plausibility of this identifying assumption. But we start of by 
showing that the baseline results are robust to changes in the specification of our 
baseline model. 
In column (1) of Table 2 we have re-specified the baseline model by replacing the 
three 12-month indicators of interest with six 6-months interval dummies. The estimates 
confirm that the baseline specification indeed does a god job in modeling the dynamic 
impact of co-workers’ childbearing on timing of fertility. As before, in the first 1–6 and 
7–12 month intervals the behavioral impact of being exposed to co-workers’ 
childbearing is small and not statistically significantly different from zero. However, in 
month 13–18 the effect shoots up and then declines slowly until it turns insignificant 
after 31–36 months. Again, the absence of effects within the first 6 months strengthens 
the conclusion that common shocks are not driving the estimated social effect. 
Next we assess whether increasing the dose of exposure that is the number of 
co-worker children born within each period, has additional effects. We do this by 
interacting the baseline variables of interest with dummy variables indicating whether 
more than one co-worker had a child 1–12, 13–24 and 25–36 months ago. The estimates 
in column (2) provide a clear dose-response pattern of being exposed to childbearing of 
several co-workers; the interaction terms are positive and of significant size. Controlling 
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suggesting that the main effect is not driven by exposure to many births. We therefore 
stick to the more parsimonious specification for the remainder of the analysis.  
As common shocks do not seem to explain the observed peer effect pattern we now 
investigate whether sorting of workers based on e.g. child-friendliness of the workplace 
is a valid concern. It is important to remember that even in the baseline model we 
control for number of previous children in the workplace, which to a large degree 
should capture selective sorting. Still it is possible that workers who are planning to 
have a child systematically move to workplaces where childbearing is more frequent. 
As a first test of the validity of this concern we split the sample with respect to tenure 
and report the results separately in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. Comparing the 
estimates we see that there are no major differences in the impact of peers on women 
with more and less than five years of tenure. If anything the effect seems to be 
somewhat stronger for those with longer tenure, suggesting that sorting into 
establishments just before planning a pregnancy is not driving our results.  
Table 2 Robustness checks 
Specification:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample:  Baseline Baseline 
 
< 5 years of 
tenure 
> 5 years of 
tenure 
1–6 months  0.00010     
  (0.00008)      
7–12 months   0.00012     
  (0.00008)     
13–18 months   0.00048***     
  (0.00008)     
19–24 months  0.00028***     
  (0.00008)     
25–30 months  0.00016**     
  (0.00008)     
31–36 months  0.00005     
  (0.00008)     
12 months     0.00002  -0.00001 0.00029 
    (0.00008)  (0.00007) (0.00021) 
13–24 months     0.00043***  0.00044*** 0.00059*** 
    (0.00008)  (0.00007) (0.00021) 
25–36 months     0.00013  0.00011 0.00040* 
    (0.00008)  (0.00007) (0.00021) 
Multiple births:        
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12 months × (>1 birth)     0.00024**    
    (0.00012)    
13–24 months × (>1 birth)    0.00030***    
    (0.0001)    
25–36 months × (>1 birth)    0.00001    
    (0.00011)    
Duration  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year×Month  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Own  characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workplace  characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Y  0.00523  0.00523  ---  --- 
Observations 5,573,397  5,573,397  4,559,220 1,014,177 
Note: see Table 1 
5.2.2  Falsification tests: placebo co-workers 
In  Table 3 we continue to more rigorously assess the validity of the identifying 
assumptions. Here we re-estimate the specification in equation (1), but instead of 
focusing on the impact of the true co-workers, we now instead look at whether the 
childbearing behavior in three “placebo peer groups” also matter for individual 
childbearing. The placebo co-workers groups we consider are: 
 1) FIRM-LEVEL CO-WORKERS: These workers are employed in the same firm, 
region (21 regions), and 2-digit industry, but not in the same workplace as the focal 
worker. Since these are individuals that have sorted into the same firm-industry-region 
as the focal worker, they are first of all likely to experience the same type of shocks that 
could generate the type of spurious relationships between co-workers that we worry 
about. Secondly, for the same reasons they are likely to be highly similar to the focal 
worker even in terms of observed (this is shown in Table A3 and discussed below) and 
unobserved characteristics. 
2) FUTURE CO-WORKERS: This placebo-peer group consists of the future 
co-worker’s to the female workers in our sample that switch workplace during the 
observation period.
14 The idea is that the contemporaneous behavior of these future 
co-workers should not have any effect on the contemporaneous behavior of the focal 
worker unless i) they already are friends, or ii) they share unobserved characteristics 
                                                 
14 To make sure that we capture actual job switchers we restrict the sample to women who switch jobs only once 
during the observation period and we require that the individual is observed for at least 2 years before and after the 
change in jobs.  
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affect the timing of childbearing. 
 3) SIBLINGS OF ACTUAL CO-WORKERS: This placebo-peer group is likely to 
share many of the co-workers observed and unobserved characteristics. They have 
experienced similar upbringing and might therefore have formed similar preferences for 
the timing of childbearing. If these unobserved preferences or characteristics are 
correlated between co-workers we expect that the childbearing of the co-workers 
siblings should not affect the focal worker unless i) they already know each other or ii) 
they share unobserved characteristics which affect the timing of childbearing. However, 
Kuziemko (2006) find evidence of fertility peer effect among siblings and hence if 
childbearing really is contagious then it is conceivable that the childbearing of siblings 
could also spill-over to the focal worker via the fertility decisions of the actual 
co-worker. In this case we would expect the effect to show up after the additional lag it 
takes for first the co-worker and then the focal worker to react. Alternatively, if the 
sibling, co-worker and the focal worker share unobserved characteristics, or if the 
sibling and the focal worker influence each other directly, we would expect to find a 
spurious placebo co-worker effect that follows the same pattern as the baseline effect of 
true co-workers. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the main samples and the three placebo peer 
groups. We conclude from this table that observed characteristics of the true co-workers 
are all highly similar to the placebo peer groups. There are essentially two exceptions; 
the average number of co-workers in the average firm is naturally much higher than in 
the average workplace, and since the labor market is segregated with respect to gender 
the average share of females among the true co-workers is higher than that among the 
co-workers’ sibling since this placebo group to a higher extent consist of brothers. In the 
empirical specification we address these differences by controlling for co-worker’ 
sibling characteristics and we also include 9 dummies for firm size where relevant. 
Since the three placebo-peer groups are fairly balanced on observed characteristics it is 
reasonable to believe that they are similar in terms of unobserved characteristics as well. 
However, we do not expect to find the same fertility peer effects for these placebo 
workers as for the true co-workers unless the childbearing of the co-workers simply 
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placebo co-workers have in common.  
Table 3 shows the estimates from these falsification tests. I.e. column (2) report the 
estimates for the first placebo peer group, “the firm co-workers”, column (4) presents 
the results for second placebo peer group “the future co-workers”, and column (5) 
shows the estimates for the third placebo peer group “co-workers’ siblings”. In addition 
since the placebo-tests restrict the samples to women who work in private firms with 
more than one workplace in column (1) and to those who switch jobs in column (3) for 
comparison we also report the impact of the true co-workers childbearing in each of 
these samples. While the estimates for these true co-workers are highly similar to the 
baseline estimates in Table 1, neither one of the three placebo co-worker regressions 
provides results that are even close to these results.
15 
Interestingly, the only estimate that is significantly different from zero in any of the 
placebo peer group regressions is the 25–36 month lagged effect in the co-workers’ 
sibling sample. To further assess this intriguing pattern we estimated a regression where 
we allowed co-workers’ siblings to affect childbearing decisions of the focal worker in 
6-months intervals for up to 52 months. The results are presented and compared to the 
baseline 6-month interval estimates (from Table 2) in Figure 1 and 2. Interestingly the 
parameter estimates are small and insignificant for the first 30 months after a birth by a 
co-worker’s siblings only to show up after a lag of 31–36 months and then fade out 
slowly. This suggests that the fertility decision spills over from the sibling of the 
co-worker via the co-worker to the focal worker supporting the notion that fertility 
decisions truly are contagious and that they may also spill-over across different 
networks. 
To summarize, the results of the robustness checks in Table 2 and falsifications tests 
in Table 3 strongly support a causal interpretation of the baseline estimates. We now 
proceed by further investigation of the underlying mechanisms that can explain the 
fertility peer effects. 
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  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (6) 








Job switchers  Job 
switchers 
All 


















Any co-worker had 
a child within: 
       
12 months   0.00012 0.00015  0.00026 -0.00003  0.00005 
  (0.00016) (0.00025)  0.00021 (0.00020)  (0.00007) 
13-24 months   0.00067*** -0.00015  0.00072*** 0.00015  0.00011 
  (0.00015) (0.00025)  0.00021 (0.00020)  (0.00007) 
25-36 months   0.00019 0.00010  0.00032 0.00000  0.00031*** 
  (0.00016) (0.00025)  (0.00022) (0.00020)  (0.00007) 
Duration dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year×Month 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Own characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
True co-worker 
characteristics 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Placebo co-worker 
characteristics 
No Yes  No  Yes Yes 
Mean Y  0.00503  0.00503  0.0058  0.0058  0.00523 
Observations  1,066,052  1,066,052 729,767  729,767  5,403,084 
Note: The specification in column (2) additionally control for firm size dummies in nine intervals (2–9, 10–19, 20–
29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–99, 100–199, 200–499, >499 employees). 
                                                                                                                                               
15 One concern is that since the number of co-workers in the same firm can be much larger than the number of 
co-workers within the same workplace we have also estimated the “same firm different workplace” regression using 
only firm that have less than 50 employees in total. These estimates were very similar to the full placebo group 
sample estimates. 














1-6 7-12 13-18 19-24 25-30 31-36 37-42 43-48
Months since birth
 

















1-6 7-12 13-18 19-24 25-30 31-36 37-42 43-48
Months since birth
 
Figure 2 Peer effects of the co-workers’ siblings’ childbearing 
22  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies 5.3  Heterogeneity: individual and co-worker characteristics 
Next we examine if the influence of the peers varies with respect the focal workers own, 
her co-workers and the workplace characteristics. In conjunction with the results we 
also discuss alternative explanations for the heterogeneous effects. 
5.3.1  Own characteristics: fertility cycle, education and civil status 
We begin in Table 4 by looking at whether the peer effect differs depending on where 
the individual is in the fertility cycle. We divide the fertility cycle into an early (age 20–
27), primary (age 28–36) and late (age 37–44) stage.
16 Columns (1)–(3) in Table 4 show 
that women are influenced in all stages of the fertility cycle and in fact most strongly 
towards the later stages.
17 This pattern could be due to the formation of tighter bonds 
between older co-workers because of longer joint tenure at the workplace. Alternatively, 
due to the concaveness of the life cycle earnings profile the cost of career interruptions 
should be relatively lower towards the end of the fertility cycle. Thus the lower costs of 
reacting to peer influences is another explanation for why women respond more 
strongly to their peers in the later stages of the fertility cycle. 
Since we do not have data on completed fertility for all workers in our sample, the 
distinction between pure timing effects and effects on completed family size is difficult. 
The fact that peers childbearing also influence women without previous children who 
are above their primary childbearing age does however indicate that social interactions 
may not only affect the timing of childbearing but also the decision of whether to have a 
child or not. We will return to this matter below when we investigate the influence of 
peers on higher order births. 
Next we look at whether the response to peers childbearing choices differs between 
married and unmarried women. This effect is ex ante ambiguous since on the one hand 
unmarried women may on average have less stable relationships making them unable to 
react as fast as married women can. On the other hand, married women may be less 
prone to be affected by outside influences if they already have made plans about the 
                                                 
16 Since we focus on women without any previous children the number of months under risk corresponds to their age. 
17 Evaluated at the mean, the estimates correspond to an increase in own childbearing of 7.3 percent in the early stage, 
9.4 percent in the primary stage and 14.5 percent in the late stage of the fertility cycle. 
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first time mothers are unmarried at the birth of the first child in Sweden, suggesting that 
marriage status perhaps is not such an important factor with respect to peer influences 
on childbearing. In columns (4) and (5) we see that although the point estimates are 
larger for the married women, when evaluated with respect to the mean the effect is 
actually larger among unmarried (10.6 %) than among married (7.1%). However, when 
looking at the cumulated effect for the entire 13–36 month period, the effect is largest 
for the married co-workers. All in all there seems to be no remarkable difference in the 
reaction to peers based on own marriage. 
Finally columns (6) and (7) present the peer effect for women with college and no 
college respectively. The estimates suggest that the peer influence for women with 
college education (column 6) is stronger than for those without college education 
(column 7), a results that squares poorly with that the peer influence should be due to 
economies of scale associated with coordinated childbearing.
18 
                                                 
18 For instance; parents can derive economic benefits due to the economies of scale that arise from coordinated 
childcare or from the sharing of necessary baby supplies (trolleys, clothes etc.). With the generous benefits attached 
to having children in Sweden we believe this effect to be of second order importance. First, Sweden has a generous 
parental leave benefit system which allows for benefits for 480 days (16 months). The benefit constitutes 80% up to a 
ceiling the first 390 days and another 90 days at flat rate. Furthermore childcare is heavily subsidized in Sweden and 
enrollment is very high. In 2004, 90 percent of all children 3-6 attended child care (National Board of Education). 
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Table 4 Differential peer effects w.r.t own characteristics 
  Dependent variable: Individual had its first child in month t 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 















Any co-worker  
had a child within:  
        
12 months  -0.00004  -0.00009  -0.00013  -0.00030 0.00005 0.00010 0.00006 
  (0.00008) (0.00025)  (0.00020)  (0.00039) (0.00007) (0.00012) (0.00009) 
13-24 months   0.00030*** 0.00087*** 0.00043** 0.00117*** 0.00041*** 0.00044*** 0.00054*** 
  (0.00008) (0.00019)  (0.00020)  (0.00038) (0.00007) (0.00012) (0.00009) 
24-36 months   0.00007  0.00032* 0.00033 0.00063*  0.00010 0.00029** 0.00007 
  (0.00008) (0.00019)  (0.00020)  (0.00038) (0.00007) (0.00012) (0.00009) 
             
Dur.  dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year×Month 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Own  char.  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workpl.  char.  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean  Y  0.00409  0.00921 0.00297 0.01645  0.00386  0.00562 0.00498 
Observations 3,838,904  1,324,836  409,657 605,112 4,967,841 2,140,535 3,432,418 
Note: see Table 2 
5.3.2  Co-worker characteristics and similarity 
In the economic as well as in the sociological literature it is well established that people 
who are similar tend to associate more (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2007; Currarini, 
Jackson and Pin, 2008; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). However, so far in 
the baseline model (equation 1) we have assumed that the fertility peer effect is 
homogenous irrespective of whom of the co-workers that is having a child. In this 
section we allow the response to co-workers childbearing to vary depending on how 






Any co-worker had a child within 12 months TYPE
Any co-worker had a child 13-24 months ago TYPE



















where   corresponds to the exact right hand side of equation (1) and TYPE is an 
indicator variable for if any of the co-worker who had a child in the previous periods 
Ω
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focal worker. Since we only focus on the impact on female workers, the same sex 
indicator measures the impact of female co-workers. The same education indicator is 
based on the college/no college education definition and is hence equal to 1 if the 
co-worker has the same level of educational attainment. Finally, two co-workers are 
defined as being close in age if they are born less than four years apart. 
Gender, age and education 
In the top panel of Table 5 the estimates of the three β ’s are presented (which as before 
corresponds to the impact of any co-workers’ childbearing), and in the bottom panel the 
estimates of the three λ ’s (which reflects the additional effect the childbearing of 
similar co-workers have). The total effect of a same-type co-worker is obtained by 
adding the main effect and the interaction effect. Starting out by looking at the 
differential impact of male and female co-workers in column (2) we find that the entire 
baseline peer effect seems to be driven by the influence of female co-workers (i.e. same 
sex).
19  More frequent interaction among female co-workers and/or gender-specific 
learning are both possible explanations for this result. In our model we always control 
for the fraction of same type co-workers in the workplace so the stronger influence that 
female co-workers exhibit cannot be explained by tighter friendships with other women 
due to workplace gender segregation but rather that they associate more given the 
fraction of female co-workers in the establishment.
20 The close-in-age specification 
estimates reported in column (3) suggest that the influence of co-workers who are 
close-in-age are substantially stronger than from other co-workers; individual fertility 
increases with 10 percent within the first 12 months and 18 percent after 13-25 months.  
Finally we look at the impact of co-workers with the same versus different 
educational level as the focal worker. Interestingly these estimates suggest that whereas 
highly educated women are affected only by other highly educated peers (column (4)), 
                                                 
 
19 Interestingly this is precisely the same pattern that Kuziemko (2006) finds when studying peer effects among 
siblings. In her case it was only sisters’ and not brothers’ childbearing that influenced the siblings’ childbearing 
decisions.  
20 The feature of networks that similar individuals tend to associate more is often referred to as “homophily” and it 
can occur for various reasons. The literature often distinguish between baseline homophily which arises due to 
26  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies low educated women are influenced by all co-workers regardless of educational level 
(remember that the total effect of same type co-workers in column (5) is the sum of the 
main effect and the interaction effect). If individuals interact mainly with co-workers 
who have the same educational level then we expect both high and low educated women 
to be primarily influenced by their same type peers. However, the anomalies in the 
same-type pattern that we find; no peer influence of low educated co-workers on high 
educated workers but a significant impact of high educated co-workers on low educated 
workers rather speak to a literature suggesting that besides similarity, individual 
interactions may also be determined by social status (c.f. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
Moreover this result is in line with laboratory experiments suggesting that people are 
influenced by the behavior of individuals with higher, but not lower, social ranking than 
themselves (Kumru and Vesterlund, 2008).
21  
                                                                                                                                               
contact availability and inbreeding bias where same-type friendships form at rates that exceed these relative fractions 
in the population (see McPherson et al (2001) for an overview on homophily).  
21 Kumru and Vesterlund (2008) show that individuals are more likely to mimic the behavior of high-status 
individuals than low- status individuals in charitable contributions.  
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Table 5 Heterogeneous peer effects: similarity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
















Any co-worker had 
a child within:  
      
12 months  0.00004 0.00007  -0.00031***  0.00011  -0.00035** 
  (0.00007) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00015) (0.00016) 
13-24 months   0.00048*** 0.00016  0.00009  0.00011 0.00063*** 
  (0.00007) (0.00011) (0.00008) (0.00014) (0.00017) 
24-36 months   0.00018** 0.00000 -0.00014* 0.00005  -0.00021 
  (0.00007) (0.00011) (0.00008) (0.00014) (0.00017) 
This type of co-worker  
had a child within:  
      
12 months    -0.00000 0.00088*** -0.00005 0.00052*** 
   (0.00012)  (0.00012)  (0.00019)  (0.00017) 
13-24 months    0.00047***  0.00107***  0.00058***  -0.00011 
   (0.00012)  (0.00012)  (0.00018)  (0.00018) 
24-36 months    0.00026**  0.00096***  0.00042**  0.00034** 
   (0.00012)  (0.00012)  (0.00018)  (0.00017) 
         
Duration dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year×Month 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Own char.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Workpl. char.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Mean Y  0.00523  0.00523  0.00523  0.00562 0.00498 
Observations 5,575,497  5,575,497  5,575,497  2,140,535 3,432,418 
Note: see previous Tables and text for the definition of variables. 
 
Birth order 
The baseline results in Table 1 reported the peer effect for women at risk of having their 
first child. In this section we examine whether co-workers also influence the timing of 
the second and third child. Since these women already had previous children they 
should have little use of further information from peers about the nature of childbearing. 
However, looking at second time mothers in column (2) of Table 6 we see that the peer 
influence is almost as strong as for first time mothers. Moreover, for this group of 
women peers childbearing increases the propensity of giving birth even within 12 
months after they had a child. This is not surprising since couples who already have had 
a previous child are likely to be able to react sooner than couples who are about to have 
28  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies their first child.
22 This difference between first and second time mothers is furthermore 
consistent with that learning about the nature of childbearing itself is more important for 
first time mothers since it may take some time before the most relevant experiences of 
the co-worker is actually realized.
23  
Even for women with two previous children we find some weak evidence (a 5% 
increase within 13–24 months) of a peer effect as suggested by column (3). Besides the 
astounding homogeneity of the timing of the effect across the birth orders, the fact that 
also third-order births may be influenced again indicates that peers may potentially also 
shift the preferences for optimal family size. Women having their third child are 
reacting somewhat slower to peer influences than second order births which consistent 
with that Swedish couples generally decide to stop trying to have more children after 
the second child is born. Hence, the time it takes women to re-negotiate the views of the 
optimal family size with partners may perhaps delay and mute any response to the 
influences of peers. This notion is also supported by the fact that the estimate for the 25-
36 month interval for the third order births is only slightly lower than the 13-24 months 
estimates, while the differences between the same two coefficients for the first and 
second order births are considerably larger.  
Related to the above finding that similar co-workers do exhibit stronger peer 
influence on each others childbearing decision, in column (4)–(6) of Table 6 we now 
look at whether individuals are differentially affected by co-workers who have the same 
number of previous children. Intuitively, this could be the case if there is some type of 
information that is unrelated to the childbearing experience in general but specific to the 
birth order of the child. For instance, mothers with one child might look at the behavior 
of their two-children peers to draw inferences of about the labor market consequences 
of having a second child, the organization of work and family with two kids, or the 
                                                 
22 We have also estimated this model using 6-months intervals. The estimates from this more flexible specification 
show that the entire within 12 month effect is driven by women giving birth between 7 and 12 after the birth of a 
co-worker’s child [est.: 0.00068 (std.err.: 0.00020)]. These estimates are retain for expositional purposes but are 
available upon request from the authors. 
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already have a child have formed tighter bonds with the co-workers who already have a 
child. 
The estimates in columns (4)–(6) are estimated using the model in equation (2), 
where TYPE now is equal to 1 if the co-worker who just gave birth previously had the 
same number of children, hence we now allow for parity-specific peer effects. Starting 
with the first-time mothers in Column (4) we find that these women are influenced by 
their co-workers’ childbearing irrespectively of the birth order of the co-worker’s child. 
In contrast, for second and third time mothers (Columns (5) and (6)), we find clear 
evidence of within-parity peer effects while cross-parity effects are completely absent. 
That is, the childbearing co-workers are only influencing behavior of the focal worker if 
they are having a child of the same birth order. 
 This clear pattern is interesting for at least two reasons. First, it suggests that the 
mechanisms underlying the peer effect seems to differ depending on own previous 
childbearing experience. Because women without children are equally influenced by the 
childbearing of any co-worker perhaps the main peer mechanism in this case is social 
learning about the childbearing experience itself. Arguably this type of information 
could be inferred from any co-worker irrespectively of their number of previous 
children. However, for higher order births individuals only use their same parity-peers 
to attain information about the specific experience of having a second or a third child, or 
the optimal timing of child spacing. Lower order childbearing among co-workers is 
however disregarded and do not change the optimal timing of their next child, 
potentially because births among lower-parity women do not generate any information 
or experience which is of any use for the focal worker. 
Second, the within-parity peer effects for the higher order births provide additional 
evidence that our identifying assumptions are valid. To see this clearly; if omitted 
variables were to generate the effect in column (5) and (6) they must be uncorrelated 
                                                                                                                                               
 
23 Additional the quicker response among women about to have their second child could go through the information 
channel by diffusion of information about the peculiarities of the of the Swedish “speed premium” policy. This policy 
provides strong economic incentives for parents to space their children closely together. See Hoem, 1990 for more 
details on the Swedish speed premium. At the same time it is important to remember that the speed premium should 
30  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies across parity groups in order to explain the pattern that we find. Standard omitted 
variables such as common unobserved shocks at the workplace level are unlikely to 
satisfy this condition: the shock would have to be due to something altering the 
childbearing incentives of the women of the same parity only and no one else. Thus we 
interpret these results as an additional and important piece of evidence that individuals 
responding to their co-workers’ fertility rather than to a common unobserved shock. 
 
Table 6 Heterogeneous peer effects: birth order 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SAMPLE: 1
st birth  2
nd birth  3
rd birth  1
st birth  2
nd birth  3
rd birth 
        
Any co-worker had a child 
within:  
      
12 months  0.00004  0.00044**  -0.00005 0.00001 0.00020 -0.00007 
  (0.00007) (0.00017) (0.00005) (0.00012) (0.00019) (0.00006) 
13–24 months   0.00048***  0.00083*** 0.00010* 0.00047***  0.00023  0.00009 
  (0.00007) (0.00017) (0.00005) (0.00011) (0.00019) (0.00005) 
24–36 months   0.00018**  0.00033** 0.00008 0.00024** -0.00009  0.00007 
  (0.00007) (0.00017) (0.00005) (0.00011) (0.00019) (0.00005) 
       
Any co-worker had a child of 
the same birth order within: 
     
12 months      0.00003  0.00029  0.00022 
      (0.00013)  (0.00028)  (0.00028) 
13–-24 months       0.00000  0.00151***  0.00040* 
      (0.00012)  (0.00025)  (0.00022) 
24–36 months       -0.00009  0.00104***  0.00040** 
       (0.00011) (0.00024) (0.00019) 
Dur.  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year×Month 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Own  char.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workpl.  char.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean  Y  0.00523 0.01105 0.00202 0.00523 0.01105 0.00202 
Observations  5,573,397 2,015,434 3,729,137 5,573,397 2,015,434 3,729,137 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for 
serial correlation at the establishment level are shown in parenthesis. The level of analysis is the individual-month. In 
addition to the fixed effects indicated by the table all regressions control for establishment size dummies in intervals 
of ten employees. Each regression is estimated on a sample of individuals at risk of having their first, second and third 
child. Hence in the second sample we condition on having a first child. The higher mean probability in column (2) 
reflects that a high share of one child parents choose to have a second child and for the same reason the number of 
person/month observations is lower for the second order birth than for the other births. 
                                                                                                                                               
have no impact on the estimated effect since we always compare mothers with the same distance from the previous 
child an hence any general speed premium effect should be controlled for by the duration dummies.  
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Next we look at whether the estimated peer effect varies with respect to workplace 
characteristics, starting with workplace size. The marginal peer effect may differ by 
workplace size either because the true fertility peer effect differs between workplaces 
with different size, or because co-workers interact differently within different sized 
workplaces. Note, however, that it is a priori not possible to determine the direction of 
the bias if for example the true peer group consists of a smaller subset of workers within 
each workplace (c.f. Manski, 1993). With these caveats in mind we divided the sample 
into 3 groups based on number of employees and estimated one separate peer regression 
for each sample. These estimates are reported in Table 7. As seen in column (1)–(3) the 
largest estimated peer effect 13–24 months since the birth to a co-workers child is found 
in the smallest workplaces (2–10 employees) (15%) and in the largest workplaces 
considered (30–49 employees) (9%). The smallest peer effect is found in medium sized 
workplaces with 10–29 employees (7%). This u-shaped marginal peer effect pattern 
with respect to workplace size is further reinforced when dividing the sample into 
smaller size brackets (2–9, 10–19, 20–29, 30–39, 40–49); the marginal peer effect 
remains strongest in the smallest and largest workplaces and lowest for the medium 
sized workplaces with 20-29 employees (not reported).  
One potential explanation consistent with this interesting workplace size pattern is 
that while the precision of our network measure decreases with workplace size, the 
frequency of exposure to co-worker childbearing increases with workplace size. Hence, 
when the network size becomes larger than a certain threshold the cumulative effect of 
multiple births among co-workers dominates the decreasing network precision effect. 
This is further consistent with the treatment-response pattern we found in Table 2; more 
exposure implies stronger peer effects. To explore whether more exposure can explain 
the peer effect in the largest workplaces we re-estimated the model including indicator 
for multiple births among co-workers 1–12, 13–24 and 25–36 months ago. As suggested 
by Table A4 in Appendix, including dummies for more than one birth does not change 
the u-shaped pattern of the peer effect with respect to the workplace size. Thus it seems 
as if exposure to multiple births cannot explain why the peer effect is stronger in larger 
workplaces than in middle-sized establishments. 
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increases the possibility to form friendships with individuals of the same type (e.g. 
gender, age, parity) and hence the positive within-type specific fertility peer effects 
could dominate any general adverse trend in the quality of our network measure 
(Weinberg, 2006). In planned future work we intend to further empirically test this and 
other potential explanations that are most likely underlying the observed pattern.  
Table 7 finally investigates if the marginal peer effect differs with respect to 
workplace sector. If employees take into account the costs of maternity leave imposed 
upon the establishment when deciding about own childbearing we would potentially see 
a weaker peer influence in the for-profit sector. However, as columns (4) and (5) shows 
there are significant spill-over effects of co-workers’ childbearing both in public and 
private establishments. The effects are not significantly different from each other.
24  
Table 7 Heterogeneous peer effects: workplace characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










Any co-worker had  
a child within:  
    
12 months  -0.00019 0.00012 0.00002 0.00011 0.00000 
  (0.00017) (0.00010) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00009) 
13–24 months   0.00078*** 0.00035*** 0.00046*** 0.00047*** 0.00049*** 
  (0.00017) (0.00009) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00009) 
24–36 months   -0.00005 0.00013 0.00022 0.00022 0.00014 
  (0.00017) (0.00010) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00009) 
       
Duration 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Month 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Own  char.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workpl.  char.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean  Y  0.00512 0.00524 0.00535 0.00602 0.00494 
Observations  1,760,442 2,664,386 1,148,125 1,523,316 3,733,621 
Note: see Table 1 
                                                 
24 It should be noted that the direct costs for employers associated with maternity leave in Sweden is zero and thus the 
only costs upon the establishment is indirect costs related to e.g. temporary human capital loss and labor substitution. 
With that in mind, individuals’ internalizing the establishment’s costs seems also inconsistent with the findings of 
strongest peer effects in the smallest workplaces where potential costs can be expected to be highest due to lower 
flexibility and opportunity for labor substitution between employees. 
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This paper explores the influences that co-workers have on their female fellow workers’ 
fertility decisions. Our results suggest that there are non-trivial peer effects on the 
choice of timing of childbearing. The main analysis shows that the effect of being 
exposed to co-workers’ childbearing increases the probability of own childbearing 
during the following 13–24 months to the same extent as lowering childcare costs with 
USD 10,000 (Mörk et al., 2008), and as much as the decreases in childbearing after job 
displacement (del Bono et al., 2008).  
The average effect however masks substantial differences in the size of the peer 
effect depending on the individual characteristics and in particular how these match the 
characteristics of the co-workers. Childbearing among co-workers who are of similar 
age, female co-workers and co-workers of the same parity are more influential. In 
contrast, childbearing of male co-workers and exposure to childbearing of co-workers 
with lower order births than the focal worker has no influence at all on the timing of 
childbearing. Apart from affecting the timing of childbearing, social influences may be 
able to affect completed fertility; both third-order births and women in the late stage of 
the fertility cycle (age 37–44) without previous children are affected. We also provide 
suggestive evidence that fertility peer effect spills-over across social multiple networks; 
from siblings of a co-worker via the co-worker to the focal worker with a lag of about 
31–36 months.  
Which types of mechanisms are most consistent with the observed peer effects? One 
explanation is that since the timing of childbearing has large effects on future earnings 
in particular for women (see e.g. Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2009), co-workers use the 
experience that other women in the same situation are confronted with after childbirth. 
Given our results, this explanation seem more likely than for example joint planning, 
economies of scale or learning about the nature of the pregnancy and childbearing 
experience itself. For example, consistent with a model of social learning we find that 
the peer effect for first time mothers is similar irrespective of the birth order of the 
co-worker’s child, while for higher order births within-parity effects are strong but 
cross-parity effects are entirely absent. These effects together with the results that the 
childbearing of more similar co-workers in other aspects are more important suggest 
34  IFAU – Business, buddies and babies that observational learning (for example about optimal timing of childbearing) is an 
important mechanism. Additionally we show that individuals are only influenced by co-
workers who have the same or higher educational level. The anomalies in this same-
type pattern are interpreted in line with theories suggesting that social status may be 
important in explaining individual behavior. 
 The results presented in this paper have several implications for both researchers and 
policy makers. There still exists a considerable controversy among demographers on 
whether public policies have the potential to affect fertility rates at all (see e.g. Hoem, 
2008). Since our findings provide evidence of significant spill-over effects within 
networks and potentially also across different social networks, when evaluating the 
impact of policies aiming to affect fertility it is important to take into account that the 
control group could also be indirectly affected. If missing to account for such spill-over 
effects the impact of the policy may be underestimated. 
 One should on the other hand also bear in mind that the net effect of a given policy 
is a combination of social interaction effects and the direct impact of the policy. 
Therefore the strong heterogeneity of the social effects found in this study suggest that 
caution is warranted before assuming that the same policy when applied in another 
context will have the same impact on fertility. In a different context the net effect of the 
same policy may yield considerably different effect depending on network composition 
and the number/strength of the social ties within the targeted treatment group. 
Additionally the peer effects we find in such an important decision as the timing of 
childbearing clearly point at the importance of social influences also for other types of 
career related decisions. Many observers have e.g. claimed that (the lack of) female role 
models in leading positions are important for women’s own propensity to consider 
similar career paths. Our findings suggesting that female employees are influenced by 
the behavior of their female, but not by their male co-workers lend some indirect 
support for these claims. If career and family choices have the tendency to spread within 
networks (for instance through observational learning) then such peer effects may be 
very important for understanding observed differences between men’s and women’s 
individual career choices and the organization of work and family. To uncover to what 
extent gender specific peer effects at work lie behind other trends in labor supply related 
IFAU – Business, buddies and babies  35 decisions; the choices to e.g. opt out of the labor force (see Bertrand et al., 2009), 
change to part-time work or to take up managerial positions, are important and 
interesting questions for future research. 
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Figure A1 Total fertility rate, 1990-2003, Source: Socialstyrelsen (2005) 
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Figure A3 Baseline hazard of second order births 
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Table A 1 Descriptive statistics  
  First birth  Second birth  Third birth 
  Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
        
Had a child in current month   0.00523 0.07210 0.01115 0.10454 0.00201 0.04482 
Age  27.6 5.4 32.5 5.1 35.3 4.3 
College education  0.38 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 
        
Number of children to co-workers  20.5 18.9 23.6 20.2 25.6 20.8 
Share fertile co-workers  0.67 0.25 0.62 0.25 0.59 0.25 
Share close in age co-workers  0.23 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.17 
Share female co-workers  0.65 0.29 0.66 0.30 0.67 0.31 
        
Establishment size  18.2 12.5 18.1 12.6 18.2 12.4 
Public sector  0.27 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.40 0.49 
Private sector  0.73 0.45 0.66 0.47 0.60 0.49 
Observations   5,575,497 2,015,434 3,730,264 
Individuals  139,020 60,534  73,518 
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 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  All All All 
Any co-worker had a child within:     


























No children to all co-workers     0.00005*** 
(0.00000) 
Share fertile co-workers     0.00017 
(0.00015) 
Share close-in-age co-workers     0.00051*** 
(0.00017) 
Share female co-workers     0.00087*** 
(0.00011) 
Share married co-workers     0.00026 
(0.00016) 
Share co-workers with college edu.     0.00034*** 
(0.00012) 
Duration dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year*Month dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Own characteristics  -  Yes  Yes 
Establishment characteristics  -  -  Yes 
Mean Y  0.00523  0.00523  0.00523 
Observations 5,575,497  5,575,497  5,573,397 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for serial correlation 
at the establishment level are shown in parenthesis. The level of analysis is the individual-month. In addition to the fixed effects 
indicated by the table regression (3) controls for establishment size dummies in intervals of ten employees.  
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Table A3 Descriptive statistics for true and placebo peer groups 
SAMPLE:  Private firms with multiple 
workplaces 

































































































This peer had a child within: 




































Observations 1,066,052  1,066,052 730,356  730,356 5,575,497  5,385,787 
Notes:
† High education is defined as having college education. The co-worker characteristics are calculated at the individual-year 
level.  
 
Table A4 Frequency of exposure and workplace size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Nr of Employees  2-9 10-29  30-49 2-9  10-29  30-49 
          




































Duration  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year*month  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Own  char.  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Est.  char.  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
More than one child  -  -  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
# Obs.  1,760,442 2,664,386 1,148,125 1,760,442  2,664,386  1,148,125 
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